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Abstract
The underlying reasons behind modern terrorism are seemingly complex and intangible. Despite diverse causal
mechanisms, research has shown that there exists general statistical patterns at the global scale that can shed light
on human confrontation behaviour. Whilst many policing and counter-terrorism operations are conducted at a city
level, there has been a lack of research in building city-level resolution prediction engines based on statistical
patterns.
For the first time, the paper shows that there exists general commonalities between global cities under terrorist
attacks. By examining over 30,000 geo-tagged terrorism acts over 7000 cities worldwide from 2002 to today, the
results shows the following. All cities experience attacks A that are uncorrelated to the population and separated by
a time interval t that is negative exponentially distributed ∼ exp(−A−1), with a death-toll per attack that follows a
power law distribution. The prediction parameters yield a high confidence of explaining up to 87% of the variations
in frequency and 89% in the death-toll data. These findings show that the aggregate statistical behaviour of terror
attacks are seemingly random and memoryless for all global cities.
The enabled the author to develop a data-driven city-specific prediction system and we quantify its information
theoretic uncertainty and information loss. Further analysis show that there appears to be an increase in the uncer-
tainty over the predictability of attacks, challenging our ability to develop effective counter-terrorism capabilities.
I. INTRODUCTION
Understanding complex human interactions is vital for solving some of humanity’s most pressing social
challenges [1]. One of these challenges is the protracted political violence that plague many urban regions
in the world. Whilst creating data-driven regression models can yield insights into ongoing violence [2],
[21], statistical patterns can also yield insight into common trends [3].
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2A. Review of Statistical Analysis
The science of finding patterns in war stretch back to the 1940s, when Richardson showed that the
intensity of major battles in the Victorian era fits power-law distributions [11], [14]. This has been
reinforced for conflict and terrorism data in the modern era [3], [16]. Tracking trends in both large-
scale wars and political violence is important to quantifying the effectiveness of peacekeeping and peace
negotiation efforts [20], [22], [30].
In terms temporal analysis (frequency or time interval between attacks), the frequency of large terrorist
attacks have also been shown to obey a power-law distribution [17], [18]. Small-scale local events have
also been studied, i.e. improvised explosive device (IED) attacks have been shown to exhibit self-excitation
behaviour modeled by a Hawkes process [23]. Long term trend analysis has been conducted recently [19],
whereby it is argued that our current period of relative peace from major wars is statistically insignificant.
The majority of statistical studies are still focused on aggregate scale attacks across a large region or
the world [3], [11], [14], [16]–[19], scenario specific local attacks [23], or long-term historical trends
[6] that span several centuries which follow various climate patterns [5], [26], [27]. It remains an open
question whether each city experiences a common human ecological behaviour in the frequency and size
of attacks. If so, it would inform urban policing and counter-terrorism policies and lead to city-specific
prediction engines.
B. Contribution
Recent attempts have examined general behaviour at national statistical levels [29] and at across
different confrontation genres [28]. However, detailed geographic analysis (city scale) across all genres
and geographies is lacking. Indeed, city scale modeling is important as counter-terrorism policies are often
adopted at the city scale (i.e., London and New York suffer disproportionately more threats and attacks
than other cities) [24]. Understanding a common ecological behaviour at detailed city resolution can help
stakeholders to create models and make forecasts.
This paper sets out to do this. In this paper, the author offers insight that inter-relates the intensity,
frequency, and prediction uncertainty of terrorist attacks in different cities worldwide since 2001. The
results across different urban ecologies show that the intensity (death-toll per attack) data still obeys a
power law [17], [18], the frequency (interval between attacks) is exponentially distributed. This enables
us to build a simple city-specific predictor based on past attack data, and we show both the information
3theoretic uncertainty and information loss in attempting to predict the underlying terrorism process. Finally,
we use spectrogram analysis to further show that there is a growing uncertainty hidden in the complex
process.
II. RESULTS
By analyzing geo-tagged terrorism and unconventional conflict data from the Global Terrorism Database
(GTD) [10], the results show that the vast majority of conflict incidents occur in close proximity to an
urban area with a mean distance of 27km. This highlights the importance of focusing on city-/town-scale
resolution analysis. Fig. 1a shows a map of terrorist incidents (2002-14), where the black stars indicate
the top 150 conflict locations (clustered to nearest city) with highest aggregate death-tolls. Fig. 1b-c shows
example of data in the highest attacked city (Baghdad) with variations in death-toll and frequency as a
function of time (day count).
A. Intensity: Power Law Distribution
The results in Fig. 1d-e show that the terrorist intensity (death-toll per attack) is distributed in accordance
to the established power law distribution [3], [14], [16]. The exponent parameters α for two random cities
are presented. The interesting observation is that most previous studies have considered low resolution
conflicts (major wars) that span over 100 years, and it seems that the power law distribution remains
valid even for high resolution terrorism and non-conventional conflict data in the modern era. What is
less understood is how the time interval between attacks is distributed, and this is the focus of the paper.
B. Interval: Negative Exponential Distribution
The results show that the time interval between sequential attacks t fit the negative exponential distri-
bution. The pdf of a negative exponential distributed variable t with support [0,+∞) is:
f(t; µˆT ) =
1
µˆT
exp(−t/µˆT ), (1)
where the parameter µˆT is the distribution parameter. Note, the exponential decay rate is given by 1/µˆT
and the variance is given by µˆ2T . Indeed, there are prior work to support this for civil war models that
can be modelled using zero-inflated count models [12].
Fig. 1f-h shows the terrorist attack interval in the top 40 conflict cities. In general, all cities examined
experience attacks that are separated by a time interval (t, days) that is negative exponentially distributed
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Fig. 1. Terrorist Attack Intensity and Interval in Top 40 Conflict Cities with Diverse Urban Scales and Climates: (a) Map of terrorist
incidents (2002-14) - the black stars indicate the top 150 conflict locations (clustered to nearest city) with highest aggregate death-tolls. (b-c)
Example of data in the highest attacked city (Baghdad) showing variations in death-toll and frequency as a function of time (day count).
(d-e) the attack intensity follows power law distribution with exponent parameters α for two example cities. (f) the predicted average attack
interval parameter µˆT is linearly correlated with the average number of attacks µˆT = 103.67/A, where 103.67 is the number of days in the
recent 13 year interval. The actual number of attacks in each city explains for 69% of the variation (adjusted R2 = 0.69) in the prediction
parameter for all cities. (g-h) shows 2 example cities and the negative exponential distribution fit for interval (days) between attacks alongside
the estimated parameter µˆT . (i-k) shows 3 example cities and their diverse population size (varies by 1 order of magnitude), diverse city
area (varies by 1 order of magnitude) and different climates.
∼ exp(−µˆT ). The results show 2 example cities and the negative exponential distribution fit for interval
between attacks and the deaths per attack, alongside the estimated distribution parameters µˆT . Under the
Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimator, the exponential distribution’s parameter µˆT is equal to the mean
of the data µ, i.e., µˆT =
∑
i Ti/A, where Ti is the actual interval between any 2 attacks, and A is the
total number of attacks in the city over all time (103.67 days in 2002-14). Fig. 1f shows the predicted
interval parameter µˆT is linearly correlated with the average number of attacks µˆT = 103.67/A. The actual
number of attacks in each city explains for 69% of the variation (adjusted R2 = 0.69) in the distribution
parameter µˆT .
For a historical data sample of terrorist attacks that is n in size, the lower- and upper-bound of the
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Fig. 2. Prediction of Next Terrorist Attack in City: the time to next attack ti is independent of the time since previous attack ti−1, and
in general the time between attacks is negative exponential distributed with dependency on the mean number of attacks ∼ exp(−A/T ). The
death-toll per attack (intensity) is power law distributed. The uncertainty of the underlying terrorism process is logarithmically proportional
to the mean time between attacks ∼ log(eT/A). The only input parameters into the model are the number of attacks A and deaths D
aggregated over a period of T .
exponential distribution parameter is given as:
µˆT,upper = µˆT
(
1− 1.96√
n
)−1
µˆT,lower = µˆT
(
1 +
1.96√
n
)−1
.
(2)
For the top 40 cities considered in the analysis, the number of attacks between 2002-2014 is between
3983 (rank 1 conflict city) to 141 (rank 40), which yields percentage changes of 3% and 14-19% to
the distribution parameter. This shows that the distribution given for the attack intensity and frequency
is robust across different urban scales and climates. Fig. 1i-k shows 3 example cities and their diverse
population size (varies by 1 order of magnitude), diverse city area (varies by 1 order of magnitude) and
different climates. A large comparison set of random cities in the top 40 conflict cities is given in Fig. 5
which shows a common statistical distribution across all of them.
C. Prediction Accuracy and Information Loss
Exponential distributions are commonly associated with waiting time between random and memoryless
events (i.e., Poisson point processes). Therefore, the fitted negative exponential distributions in Fig. 1
indicate that sequential attacks in each city are unrelated. A possible reason is that each terrorist attack
depends on a large number of variables (i.e., organization, logistics, finance, personnel, evading detection,
and opportunity), which suppresses any dependency between attacks. One other interesting property means
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Fig. 3. Accuracy and Information Loss in Prediction: directed K-L divergence (information loss) for predicting the time interval between
attacks.
that the probability of the waiting time for the next attack is constant, irrespective of how much time has
surpassed. That is to say, one only needs to understand one single parameter µˆT in order to predict the
time for the next attack, irrespective of when the last attack was. This is similarly true for the death-toll
per attack: the number of deaths in the next attack is independent of the previous attack event’s death-toll.
As an example, Fig. 2 illustrates a system for prediction of the next terrorist attack and the uncertainty
of the terrorism process. The time to next attack ti is independent of the time since previous attack ti−1,
and in general the time t between attacks is negative exponential distributed with dependency on the mean
number of attacks t ∼ exp(−A/T ) and the death d is power law with dependency on the exponent α. The
uncertainty of the underlying terrorism process is logarithmically proportional to the mean time between
attacks log(eT/A). The only input parameters into the model are the number of attacks A and deaths D
aggregated over a period of T . Among all continuous probability distributions with support [0,+∞) and
mean µˆ, the exponential distribution has the largest entropy of log(eµˆ):
h(X) =−
∫ +∞
0
1
µˆ
exp(−x/µˆ) log
[
1
µˆ
exp(−x/µˆ)
]
dx
=1− log(1/µˆ) = log(eµˆ).
(3)
This indicates a logarithmic higher information content (uncertainty) in the underlying terrorism processes
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Fig. 4. Temporal Variations in the Frequency of Attacks: (a) the growing number of attacks and deaths and the death per attack is
uncorrelated with the attack frequency. (b) the rapid growth (G = 1.2− 0.5) in the magnitude of low frequency attacks. (c) the slow growth
(G = 0.3− 0.2) in the magnitude of high frequency attacks. (d-e) the spectrogram of the attacks between 2012-2014 for 2 example cities,
with slices of low and high frequency magnitude variations as a function of time (days).
(i.e., the terrorist organizations) that plan attacks with high waiting duration µˆT .
In prediction, we assume that for an observed city that has suffered n previous attacks and these attacks
have a frequency and intensity that are both exponentially distributed with unknown parameters. A common
predictor for random and negative exponentially distributed data x is to use is the Maximum-Likelihood
(ML) predictor, which yields the following predictive density: pML(xn+1|x1, ..., xn) = 1µ exp(−xn+1µ ), where
xn+1 is the future data value. An improved predictive distribution free of the issues of choosing priors
is the Conditional Normalized Maximum Likelihood (CNML) estimator yields the following predictive
density of the future data [7]:
pCNML(xn+1|x1, ..., xn) = n
n+1µn
(nµ+ xn+1)n+1
, (4)
where µ is taken from the data ({x1, ..., xn}).
Given that both the time interval and the intensity (death-toll) fit negative exponential distributions, based
on Eq.(6), the directed Kullback-Leibler (K-L) divergence (information loss) of adopting an exponential
8model instead of using the data is:
DK-L(µ‖µˆ) = log(µ−1)− log(µˆ−1) + µ
µˆ
− 1, (5)
where µ is the mean of the data and µˆ is the parameter of the regression or predictor. In general, as
shown in Fig. 3, the negative exponential model causes a loss in information that varies between 1.2-2.8
nats (0.7-3.3 bits). This demonstrates that despite the seemingly accurate statistically characterization of
conflict frequency, there is a non-negligible surprise element from an information theoretic sense.
D. Spectrogram Analysis
The frequency and intensity of violence has shifted over the past decade and this will affect the long term
accuracy of the proposed prediction model. Spectral analysis has the potential to observe the different
frequency components of attacks and how they shift with time (2002-2014). As a hypothesis, it can
potentially distinguish low frequency (long time interval T/A) high casualty (death-toll D/A) attacks
from high frequency low casualty attacks. Spectral analysis using Short-Time-Fourier-Transform (STFT)
is used on each city to produce spectrogram plots. The parameters used are Hamming window of size
128 (days), with non-overlap size of 120, 128 Fast-Fourier-Transform sampling points to calculate the
Discrete Fourier Transform. In general, the STFT of a discrete sequence x[n] is defined as: X(m,ω) =∑+∞
−∞ x[n]w[n −m] exp(−jωn), where w[n] is the window function and ω is the continuous frequency,
and the spectrogram is defined as |X(m,ω)|2.
In Fig. 4, the results show the magnitude of the frequency of attacks as a function of time. Fig. 4(a-left)
shows the growing number of attacks and show in (a-right) that the deaths per attack is uncorrelated with
the attack frequency. Digging deeper using spectrogram analysis, the author shows that there is a rapid
growth (G = 1.2−0.5) in the magnitude of low frequency attacks (b), and a slow growth (G = 0.3−0.2)
in the magnitude of high frequency attacks (c). The results indicate that the growth in the number of
attacks and deaths is largely due to low frequency attacks, which is causing a disproportionate number
of high deaths (see the high variance in (a-right)). Fig. 4(d-e) show the spectrogram of the attacks for 2
example cities, with slices of low and high frequency magnitude variations as a function of time (days).
The growing number of attacks (and deaths) is not due to population increases, as shown by the lack of
correlation in Fig. 6 in the Methods.
In summary, the spectrogram analysis reveals that the growth in death-tolls from terrorist attacks seems
9to be due to an increase in the number of slower (1 attack per 100 days) and bigger casualty attacks (over 10
deaths per attack). Referring back to the entropy of the terrorism process (i.e., entropy is log(eT/A)), the
growing number of low-frequency (large T/A) and high death-toll indicates that the underlying terrorism
process and organization is increasing in uncertainty. It is unclear how to combine the entropy measures
if the high death-toll attacks are dependent on the longer planning process, and this is the focus of future
research.
III. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION
Despite the seemingly complex reasons that drive modern terrorism, conflict and violence, this paper
has shown that all modern conflicts exhibit common frequency and intensity patterns that can be modeled
accurately to give true predictive powers to smart city systems. By examining over 30,000 geo-tagged
conflict data points over 13 recent years, the paper demonstrates the following. The number of attacks
and the death-toll is uncorrelated to the population of the city. The attacks are separated by a time that is
negative exponentially distributed ∼ exp(−µˆT ) and the number of deaths per attack follows power law
distributions. The prediction parameters explains for 69-87% of the variations in real data. Whilst the
parameters of the distributions vary between cities and with time, these findings show that the frequency
of terror attacks is random and memoryless.
The distributions found in this paper can be used to predict the next attack and the Kullback-Leibler
divergence is used to show that approximately 0.7-3.3 bits of information is lost through the predictions.
As such, future work should focus on integrating generalized statistical models presented in this paper
with microscopic excitation and mechanical models [23].
Using spectrogram analysis, it was uncovered that the growth in death-tolls is due to a growing number
of slower but higher casualty attacks. Combining the spectrogram analysis with the entropy analysis, the
combined results seem to indicate a logarithmically increasing uncertainty in the underlying terrorism
random process. This uncertainty makes prediction and developing counter-terrorism strategies more
challenging.
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IV. METHODOLOGY
A. Data
The terrorism and conflict data used in this paper is sourced from 30,000+ attacks between 2002 to
2014 (13 years) from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) [10]. For each city and over time period T ,
the GTD contains the number of geo-tagged attacks A and death-toll D from incidents, which range from
small-scale assassinations (1 death) to large-scale massacres (1000s dead). A plot of the major terrorist
and conflict incidents is shown in Fig. 1a. The GTD data is then clustered to the nearest city1. As a result
of clustering, the author shows that the vast majority of conflict incidents occur in close proximity to an
urban area with a mean clustering distance of 27km. This means whilst most data points are in cities,
some do occur in rural and suburban areas, which is still relevant from a policy perspective. It is worth
noting that the number of attacks (and deaths) is not due to population increases, as shown by the lack
of correlation in Fig. 6. Therefore, models with predictive power are needed to understand the frequency
and intensity of attacks for each city.
Using the data, 2 variables are extracted: (1) the time interval t between each consecutive attack
(frequency), and (2) the death-toll per attack d (intensity). Of the data obtained between 2002 and 2014,
only 40 cities in the world have sufficient conflict data to obtain distributions from which the error in
Maximum Likelihood (ML) parameter estimation is less than 20% (see Results section). These cities
range from the Middle East, West Africa, South Asia, to the Far East. A list of the cities can be found
in Table I.
B. Metrics
In order to compare between data sets, the coefficient of determination R2 is used. It is a number
that indicates how well the statistical regression model fits the data. In other words, the percentage of
variance in the data that can be explained by the proposed model. For a data vector y = [y1, y2, ...yK ]
(with mean y) and a predicted data vector using the regression model yˆ, the residue vector is defined as
e = y − yˆ. The coefficient of determination R2 is defined as R2 ≡ 1 −
∑
k e
2
k∑
k(yk−y)2 , where the numerator
is known as the residual sum of squares and the denominator is known as the total sum of squares. In
this paper, the analysis employs the adjusted R2 to take discount against extra variables in the model
adjusted R2 = 1− (1−R2) K−1
K−V−1 , where V is the number of variables in the regression model.
1over 7000 cities and settlements were considered sourced from the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency [8].
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a) Attack Interval: Common Statistical Behaviour b) Death-Toll: Common Statistical Behaviour
Fig. 5. Terrorist Attack Interval and Intensity in Random Sample of Top 40 Conflict Cities with Diverse Urban Scales and Climates
(a) Common exponential distribution for attack intervals across random cities. (b) Common distribution for death-toll per attack across
random cities.
In order to compare between different probability distributions P (true data) and Q (regression model),
the directed information gain/loss metric is used. The Kullback-Leibler (K-L) divergence of Q from P is
DK-L(P‖Q), and it is defined as [13]:
DK-L(P‖Q) =
∫ +∞
−∞
p(x) log
p(x)
q(x)
dx, (6)
where p(x) and q(x) denote the densities of P and Q. For exponential distributions, this is given as:
DK-L(µ‖µˆ) = log(µ−1)− log(µˆ−1) + µµˆ − 1.
C. Supporting Analysis
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Fig. 6. Attacks are Uncorrelated with the Population of the City.
TABLE I
TOP 40 PROMINENT CONFLICT CITIES
City(1-20) Country City(21-40) Country
Baghdad Iraq Musayyib Iraq
Mosul Iraq Banghazi Libya
Baqubah Iraq Farah Afghanistan
Karachi Pakistan Zareh Afghanistan
Kirkuk Iraq Jalalabad Afghanistan
Lashkar Afghanistan Kabul Afghanistan
Peshawar Pakistan Ghazni Afghanistan
Mogadishu Somalia Saidu Pakistan
Yala Thailand Kohat Pakistan
Fallujah Iraq Pattani Thailand
Kandahar Afghanistan Qalat Afghanistan
Quetta Pakistan Cotabato Philippines
Asadabad Afghanistan Tall Afar Iraq
Tikrit Iraq Meymaneh Afghanistan
Ramadi Iraq Qasr Shirin Iran
Bannu Pakistan Gardiz Afghanistan
Parachinar Pakistan Baraki Afghanistan
Narathiwat Thailand Sukkur Pakistan
Samarra Iraq Groznyy Russia
Maiduguri Nigeria Tizi-Ouzou Algeria
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